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FINALITY, APPEALABILITY, AND THE SCOPE OF
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
Bryan Lammon*
Abstract: Most of the law of federal appellate jurisdiction comes from judicial
interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. That statute gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over
only “final decisions” of the district courts. The federal courts have used this grant of
jurisdiction to create most of the rules governing appellate jurisdiction. But those efforts have
required giving many different meanings to the term “final decision.” And those many different
meanings are to blame for much of the confusion, complexity, unpredictability, and
inflexibility that plague this area of law. The literature has accordingly advocated reform that
would base most of the law on something other than case-by-case interpretations of what it
means for a decision to be “final.” Before any reform, however, it is crucial to understand the
ways in which the federal courts have interpreted the term “final decision.”
This article unearths the three contexts in which courts have interpreted § 1291 to create
three different kinds of rules: (1) rules about when district court proceedings have ended and
parties can take the classic, end-of-proceedings appeal on the merits; (2) rules about when
litigants can appeal before the end of those proceedings; and (3) rules limiting or expanding
the scope of review in those before-the-end-of-proceedings appeals. Though related, these
contexts are distinct, involve unique interests, and raise unique issues. Successful reform must
fill all of the roles that interpretations of the term “final decision” have played. In the meantime,
federal courts could bring some much-needed candor and transparency to this area of law by
acknowledging the three different ways in which they have used this term.
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INTRODUCTION
The law of federal appellate jurisdiction is widely regarded as a mess.1
In past work, I have argued for wholesale, rules-based reform of this area.2
Rules-based reform could bring some much-needed clarity and
predictability to this area of the law.3 It could reduce some of the difficulty
lawyers and judges often have.4 Rules-based reform might even reduce
the frequency of odd decisions that courts sometimes make in this area.
Then, in 2017’s Microsoft Corp. v. Baker,5 the Supreme Court
appeared to hold that the district court proceedings in a case never ended.6

1. Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-Final
Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 291 (1999); Bryan Lammon,
Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 430 (2013)
[hereinafter Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation]; Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for NonDiscretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1649,
1651 (2011) [hereinafter Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation]; Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate
Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238–39 (2007).
2. See generally Bryan Lammon, Cumulative Finality, 52 GA. L. REV. 767 (2018) [hereinafter
Lammon, Cumulative Finality]; Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the
Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH.
L. REV. 371 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie]; Bryan Lammon, Perlman Appeals
After Mohawk, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Lammon, Perlman Appeals].
3. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 414–15.
4. See Lammon, Cumulative Finality, supra note 2, at 830.
5. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).
6. Id. at 1715.
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The plaintiffs in Baker voluntarily dismissed all of their claims with
prejudice, and the district court had nothing else to do.7 But according to
the Court, the voluntary dismissal in Baker was not a “final decision” and
thus could not be appealed.8 A final decision is normally defined as one
that marks the end of district court proceedings, leaving nothing else for
the district court to do but enforce the judgment.9 That standard definition
suggests that the decision in Baker was final. The Supreme Court said,
however, that it wasn’t. So it would seem that the district court
proceedings in Baker were interminable.
That’s silly, of course. What the Court really meant was that the
plaintiffs could not appeal the voluntary dismissal. That conclusion was
unmistakably correct.10 But in reaching that conclusion, the Court had to
once again determine what it means for a decision to be “final” in the
context of appellate jurisdiction.
Baker illustrates the source of many problems that plague federal
appellate jurisdiction. Most of the law in this area is built atop 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291,11 which gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over only “final
decisions” of the district courts. And although that term has a standard
definition, the federal courts have not limited themselves to that single
definition. Instead they regularly elaborate on what it means for a decision
to be “final,” and those elaborations account for much of the current law.
Therein lies the problem. The federal courts have given the term “final
decision” a variety of meanings. Those meanings often deviate from—
and are occasionally inconsistent with—the standard definition just
mentioned. For example, decisions (like the one in Baker) that mark the
actual end of district court proceedings are not always considered “final.”
But other decisions that come before—sometimes long before—the end
of those proceedings are deemed “final.” Courts have even held that
certain parts of a district court’s decision are “final” while others are not.
Appellate jurisdiction has thus become a world of Orwellian doublespeak,
where the meaning of “final” changes from context to context,
occasionally in ways that defy any intuitive understanding of the term.12
7. Id. at 1711.
8. Id. at 1707.
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 897, 902
(2015); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815,
817 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that a judgment was appealable if it “end[ed] the litigation and [left]
nothing but execution of the court’s decision, the standard definition of ‘final’ under § 1291”).
10. See infra section II.A.4 for a discussion of why the outcome in Baker was correct.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
12. The final decision is not the only procedural term that has suffered from a variety of meanings.
Jurisdiction, for example, was often used to mean different things, though the Supreme Court has
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The result is our often-criticized system of federal appellate
jurisdiction. Although many of the rules governing appeals in everyday
cases are sufficiently clear, the rest have been maligned as complex,
confusing, inconsistent, unpredictable, and insufficiently flexible.13
Courts and lawyers expend significant time and effort (and clients expend
money) on side issues of appellate jurisdiction rather than the merits.14
Despite the array of opportunities for immediate appeals, most believe
that there should be more.15 And litigants occasionally lose their right to
appeal due to confusion about the law.16
The culprit, according to the literature, is the federal courts’
dependence on interpretations of the term “final decision” as the source
for most of the law of appellate jurisdiction. The solution is to break that
dependence by instead basing the law on more candid discussions of the
issues and interests in this area.
Before we do that, however, there is something to be learned from the
ways in which the courts have interpreted § 1291. The literature has
largely focused on one kind of appellate-jurisdiction rule that the federal
courts have created: deciding when litigants can appeal before the normal
end of district court proceedings. These rules—which I call rules of
“appealability”—are important. But they are not the only kind of
jurisdictional rules that the courts have created out of § 1291 and the term
“final decision.”
They have instead created three kinds of rules. First are what I call rules
governing “true finality.” These are rules about when litigants can take
their traditional, end-of-proceedings appeal on the merits. But the end of
district court proceedings, at least for appeal purposes, can be surprisingly
elusive. Second are the just-mentioned rules governing appealability. And
third are rules governing the scope of interlocutory review. These are rules
that limit or expand the issues that a court of appeals can review in an
recently tried to clean up the use of the term. See generally Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects,
105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017); Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings”,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 947 (2011).
13. See Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 165, 165–66 (1984); Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in
Context, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (1984); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 291;
Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 1, at 1651; Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an
Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527,
556 (2002).
14. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 157; Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils, and Snares: Appeals
Before Final Judgment, 15 LITIG. 18, 18 (1989); Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal FinalityAppealability Problem, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984).
15. Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 278
(2017); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 1, at 1660.
16. See Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177 (2014).
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appeal that comes before the end of district court proceedings. Although
these contexts are related to one another, each raises unique issues and
involves distinct considerations.
This Article unearths the three contexts in which courts have
interpreted § 1291 to create rules of appellate jurisdiction. It describes
each of these contexts and gives examples of rules the courts have created
in each. And although the appellate-jurisdiction literature has given
substantial attention to the ways in which courts have interpreted § 1291
to create rules of appealability, it has overlooked the other two contexts.
The revelation of all three contexts is crucial for both courts and
rulemakers. For courts, it gives some structure to the various ways that
they have interpreted the term “final decision” to craft rules of appellate
jurisdiction. Using this single term to craft three different kinds of rules—
and doing so without acknowledging the three different contexts—
accounts for much of the confusion and complexity in this area of the law.
Courts accordingly might benefit from acknowledging these three relatedbut-distinct kinds of rules. Doing so would inject some clarity into the law
of appellate jurisdiction. It might also focus courts on the unique interests
at stake when forming each of these rules, ultimately leading to more
practically sound rules of appellate jurisdiction.
More importantly, understanding the three contexts in which courts
have interpreted § 1291 is essential to reform. Reform is the main focus
of the appellate-jurisdiction literature. Because of the uncertainty and
complexity that reliance on the term “final decision” has created, much of
the literature would abandon that term in favor of some other foundation
for federal appellate jurisdiction, such as appellate court discretion or
codified rules. Most calls to abandon reliance on the term (including some
of my own) focus on only one way in which the courts use § 1291: crafting
rules of appealability. But courts have used § 1291 to do much more.
Abandoning the term “final decision” and replacing it with rules that
address only issues of appealability will leave crucial gaps in the law. For
any reform to adequately replace courts’ reliance on § 1291 and the term
“final decision,” it must fill the role that the term has played in all three
contexts.
I proceed as follows. Part I describes the central role of final decisions
in modern federal appellate jurisdiction, the many meanings of that term,
and the proposed rejection of final decisions as the organizing principle
of appellate jurisdiction. Part II breaks down the term, revealing the three
contexts in which courts have interpreted it to craft rules of appellate
jurisdiction. Part III explains why distinguishing between these three
contexts would help courts bring some clarity to this area of the law. It
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also contends that reformers must reckon with each context if reform is to
succeed. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

FINAL DECISIONS & MODERN FEDERAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION

A.

The Role of the “Final Decision” in Federal Appellate Jurisdiction

The key jurisdictional statute for the federal courts of appeals is 28
U.S.C. § 1291. This statute gives those courts jurisdiction to review only
“final decisions” of the district courts.17 And for nearly all federal appeals,
§ 1291 is the source of appellate jurisdiction.18
To be sure, several statutes and rules provide alternative grounds for
appellate jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit, for example, gets its unique
jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1295.19 Other statutes allow appeals over
non-final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) allows for the immediate
appeal of certain orders regarding injunctive relief.20 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.”).
18. Precise statistics on the grounds for appellate jurisdiction are not available. But in the period
between March 31, 2016 and March 31, 2017, litigants commenced 58,951 proceedings in the twelve
regional courts of appeals. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2017, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2017
[https://perma.cc/98HU-TJ8K]. Original proceedings in those courts—which can have a variety of
jurisdictional bases besides § 1291—accounted for 13,391 of those proceedings (or about 23%). Id.
Appeals from administrative agencies accounted for another 6,463 (or about 11%), while appeals
from the bankruptcy courts added another 671 (or 1%). Id. Of the remaining 38,426 proceedings
commenced in that twelve-month period (about 65%), most were probably from what the federal
courts consider to be “final decisions.” Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012 & Supp. III 2015). That jurisdiction covers, for example, appeals
involving patents or claims for the recovery of paid taxes, as well as appeals from the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of International Trade. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal
Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1461–64 (2012). Although the present focus is on appeals
from district courts, it is worth mentioning that several statutes give the courts of appeals jurisdiction
to review administrative actions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (granting jurisdiction over, among other
things, certain orders of the Federal Communication Commission and Secretary of Agriculture). For
more on appellate jurisdiction over administrative actions, see generally THOMAS E. BAKER, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 85–90 (2d ed.
2009); 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 3940–3944 (3d ed. 2008).
20. Specifically, § 1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over orders “granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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allows a district court to certify an interlocutory order for an immediate
appeal in civil cases, which the courts of appeals then have discretion to
review.21 And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) gives the courts of
appeals discretion to review certain interlocutory orders regarding class
certification.22 Other examples exist.23
Still, these statutes and rules cover a relatively small portion of federal
appeals. Appellate jurisdiction for the majority of federal appeals comes
from § 1291 and its grant of jurisdiction over only “final decisions.”
B.

The Many Meanings of “Final”

So most federal litigants who want to appeal can do so only after the
district court enters a final decision. But on its face, it’s not obvious what
that term means. Most every district court proceeding ends in a “final
judgment”—a document that reflects the disposition of all claims in an
action. But Congress did not give the courts of appeals jurisdiction over

21. See id. § 1292(b) (“When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in
writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action
may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order . . . .”). For more on
§ 1292(b), see generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3929; Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L.
Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995–2010), 60 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (2011); Michael E. Solimine,
Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990); Tory
Weigland, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First Circuit Survey
and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183 (2014); Note, Discretionary Appeals of District
Court Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69 YALE
L.J. 333 (1959); Mackenzie M. Horton, Note, Mandamus, Stop in the Name of Discretion: The
Judicial “Myth” of the District Court’s Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion in Section 1292(b)
Certification, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 976 (2012); Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607 (1975).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the
circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”). For more on Rule 23(f), see generally Lori
Irish Bauman, Class Certification and Interlocutory Review: Rule 23(f) in the Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 205 (2007); Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification
Decisions: A Preliminary Study of Federal and State Experience, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 16–22
(2007); Kenneth S. Gould, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Interlocutory Appeals of Class
Action Certification Decisions, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 309 (1999); Michael E. Solimine &
Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by
the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000).
23. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2012 & Supp. II 2014) (allowing immediate appeals from certain orders
regarding arbitration); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2012) (allowing the prosecution in a criminal case to appeal
certain district court decisions before a final judgment).
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only “final judgments.” It instead used the term “final decisions,”24 which
requires some interpretation.
Historically, a final decision was one that ended trial court proceedings.
That was the understanding in the English courts of law, from which the
current final-judgment rule originates.25 In those courts, appellate review
waited until the end of trial court proceedings.26 And that made sense;
most proceedings at law involved relatively simple issues and procedure,
and most produced a single judicial decision at the end of a single
hearing.27 So delaying appeals imposed few hardships on litigants.28
When Congress created the federal courts in the First Judiciary Act of
1789, it adopted the same approach to appeals, allowing review of only
“final decrees and judgments.”29 That general grant of jurisdiction has
persisted to modern times and is now found in § 1291.30
In modern practice, the federal courts typically equate a final decision
and a final judgment. When defining what constitutes a “final decision,”
courts often invoke what they call the “final-judgment rule”—a final
decision marks the end of district court proceedings, when all issues have
been decided and all that remains is enforcing the judgment.31
Were that the only definition of a “final decision,” § 1291 would allow
appeals only at the end of district court proceedings. But that’s not the
only definition. Federal courts have instead given the term a variety of
meanings. Consider just some of the ways in which the courts have
elaborated on what constitutes a final decision:
A decision that resolves an action on the merits but leaves open an
issue of attorneys’ fees (such as the entitlement to them or their
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
25. See Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 540–44
(1932); Waters, supra note 13, at 532–33.
26. See Crick, supra note 25, at 540–44; Waters, supra note 13, at 532–33.
27. See Crick, supra note 25, at 553; Waters, supra note 13, at 532–33.
28. Extraordinary circumstances that required immediate review were addressed through
extraordinary writs. See Waters, supra note 13, at 532–33.
29. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 83–86.
30. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 35; Cooper, supra note 13, at 157; Solimine, supra note 21, at
1168.
31. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015); Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2015)
(concluding that a judgment was appealable if it “end[ed] the litigation and [left] nothing but
execution of the court’s decision, the standard definition of ‘final’ under § 1291”); Dig. Equip. Corp.
v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 543 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657
(1977); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 356–60
(2007) (discussing the final-judgment rule’s history).
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amount) is a final decision, even though more (namely, resolving
any issues on fees) remains to be done in the district court.32
A decision on liability that leaves for later resolution the
calculation of damages is not normally final.33 But when
calculation of damages would be a ministerial or technical
matter—that is, easily determined and likely uncontested—a
decision on liability is final, even though more remains to be done
in the district court.34
A plaintiff’s decision to voluntarily dismiss all claims with
prejudice in a purported class action—along with the district
court’s decision accepting that dismissal—is not final.35
District court orders that remand a dispute back to an executive
agency are normally not final decisions.36 But they are final when
the remand might leave one of the parties without a later
opportunity for appellate review.37
Under the collateral-order doctrine, a district court decision that
conclusively resolves an issue that is important and completely
separate from the merits, and that would be effectively
unreviewable in an appeal at the end of district court proceedings,
is final.38
Under the pragmatic or balancing approach to appeals, courts may
deem a district court decision final and thus appealable when the
benefits of an immediate appeal outweigh the costs.39
Finally, in the context of qualified immunity appeals—that is,
interlocutory appeals from decisions denying a claim of qualified
immunity—courts have held that only parts of a district court’s
32. See Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177, 179 (2014); Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988); see also infra section II.A.1.
33. See Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976).
34. See Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995); Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local
504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1401–02 (7th Cir. 1992); Woosley v. Avco Corp., 944 F.2d
313, 317 (6th Cir. 1991).
35. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1707, 1712–13 (2017).
36. See N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
37. See Davies v. Johanns, 477 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 2007); Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919,
923 (7th Cir. 1993); Perales v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991); Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
38. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); BAKER, supra note 19, at 42–45; 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
19, §§ 3911–3911.5.
39. See Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 149–50 (1964); United States v. Bokhari, 757
F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 11-15670, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12114, at *12 (11th Cir. June 13, 2013) (per curiam).
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decision are final. In those appeals, the courts of appeals normally
have jurisdiction over relatively abstract legal questions: do the
facts make out a constitutional violation, and was the constitutional
right clearly established at the time?40 That part of the order is
final.41 The courts lack jurisdiction to review the more fact-bound
issue of whether the summary judgment record supports the district
court’s assumed version of the facts.42 That part is not final.43 That
is, unless something in that record blatantly contradicts those
assumed facts.44 In such a case, the entire decision is final and the
court of appeals has jurisdiction over all of it.45
I discuss these and other examples in further depth below. The point
for now is merely to illustrate the many inconsistent meanings of a final
decision. Sometimes a decision that marks the end of district court
proceedings is final. But sometimes it’s not. And sometimes, decisions
that come long before the end of those proceedings are final. Other,
seemingly similar decisions are not. And the courts have even cut up
district court decisions, concluding that some parts are final and some
aren’t.
These and other interpretations of § 1291 account for the bulk of the
law of federal appellate jurisdiction; all of these rules rest atop § 1291 and
its use of the term “final decision.” And that’s necessarily been the case.
The statutes and procedural rules governing federal appellate jurisdiction
are few. But the practicalities of modern federal litigation have required
more than this handful of statutes and rules of procedure if the system is
to work. The courts have been left the task of filling in the rather large
gaps. They’ve chosen to create their own rules. Virtually the only tool the
courts have used to do so is case-by-case interpretations of § 1291.46
But courts have had to appear circumspect when doing so. Congress,
after all, has final say over the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction. Courts
are not supposed to create exceptions to those congressionally mandated

40. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314 (1995).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 313.
43. See id.
44. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–20 (2014); Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007).
45. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81.
46. The one exception is the Supreme Court’s use of its rulemaking power to adopt Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(f). See supra note 22.
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rules.47 Indeed, courts often hesitate to call these rules “exceptions” to
§ 1291.48 They are instead characterized as “interpretations” or “practical
constructions” of that statute.49
Perhaps this is all by design. Congress gave the courts of appeals
jurisdiction to review final “decisions,” not final “judgments,” suggesting
that this grant of jurisdiction was to be elaborated on through common
law decisionmaking. Congress thus might have intended that the courts
have both a standard definition as well as various elaborations for other
circumstances.50
In this sense, “final decision” is a term of art. Determining whether a
decision is final would require looking not only at whether district court
proceedings had ended, but also at the variety of considerations that
underlie the law of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
occasionally acknowledged the common-law approach to § 1291. In
1940, the Court observed that finality “is not a technical concept of
temporal or physical termination.”51 It is instead “the means for achieving
a healthy legal system.”52 The Court repeated this observation in Baker.53
Whatever the intention, federal litigants are left with an immense body
of law built atop varied and inconsistent interpretations of a single term.
“Final decision” has become a term of art.

47. See Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 731 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To be clear,
we do not engage in this analysis to determine if there is an exception to the finality rule; courts of
appeals do not have authority to create exceptions to congressional limits on jurisdiction.”).
48. See id. But see Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (“Section 1291
accordingly provides jurisdiction for this appeal only if orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases fall
within the ‘collateral order’ exception to the final judgment rule.”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (“Our decisions have recognized . . . a narrow exception to the
requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await final judgment on the merits.”).
49. See, e.g., Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (“The collateral
order doctrine is best understood not as an exception to the ‘final decision’ rule laid down by Congress
in § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’ of it.” (citation omitted)); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345,
349 (2006) (same). I have argued that this distinction between exceptions and interpretations can be
unnecessarily confusing. See Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 2, at 27–28.
50. Even if Congress did not initially intend for a common-law approach to interpreting § 1291,
there is some indication that it has subsequently done so. In 1990, Congress amended the Rules
Enabling Act to empower the Supreme Court to promulgate rules “defin[ing] when a ruling of a
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)
(2012). In doing so, Congress appears to have acknowledged and accepted that “final decision” does
not have a single meaning.
51. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940).
52. Id.
53. See Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1715 (2017).
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The Proposed Rejection of § 1291’s “Final Decision” as the
Foundation for Federal Appellate Jurisdiction

As a term of art, the “final decision” has failed for at least three reasons.
First, the term is misleading. For those steeped in the law of appellate
jurisdiction, treating “final decision” as a term of art might pose relatively
few problems; experts can navigate much of this law, though it will still
produce instances of uncertainty.54 But the rules of appellate jurisdiction
exist for everyone, not just experts. And those who aren’t expert can face
a steep learning curve when determining whether a decision is final.55
Indeed, giving the term “final decision” anything except its standard and
intuitive meaning risks misleading those who must apply it. Giving the
term multiple and often inconsistent meanings multiplies that risk.
Second, reliance on the term has sown confusion in the law of appellate
jurisdiction. This is due in part to the term’s just-discussed misleading
nature. But this confusion is due also to the ways that courts have used
§ 1291. In using interpretations of § 1291 to create most of the rules that
a modern system of appellate jurisdiction requires, the courts have been
pulled in different directions.56 On the one hand, the courts try to create
clear, consistent, and predictable rules.57 On the other hand, modern
federal litigation requires flexibility in the timing of appeals; not all
appeals can wait until the end of district court proceedings.58 Sometimes
the courts focus on the former interest—clarity, consistency, and
predictability—and give the term “final decision” its standard, established
meaning.59 Other times courts address the latter interest—flexibility—and
give the term new meanings, some of which conflict with prior
pronouncements on what it means for a decision to be final.60 These
interests are in tension, and they are occasionally irreconcilable. Courts
have nevertheless tried to satisfy both interests by interpreting the same
term—“final decision.”61

54. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 157 (“Lawyers and judges who are expert in working with the
system are able to identify the doctrinal rules and lines of argument, but often encounter elusive
uncertainty in seeking clear answers to many problems.”).
55. Id. (“Those who are less than expert are apt to go far astray.”).
56. See Bryan Lammon, Hall v. Hall and the Courts’ Lose-Lose Approach to Appellate
Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1001, 1011 (2018).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1011–12.
61. See id.
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The results are not always pretty. By nearly every account, the current
system of federal appellate jurisdiction—a general final-judgment rule
coupled with a handful of statutory and rule-based exceptions and an
immense variety of judicial elaborations on what it means for a decision
to be final—is unacceptable.62 These criticisms have been covered
extensively elsewhere and need not be repeated in depth here.63 Suffice it
to say that most everyone views the system as overly complex and
insufficiently predictable.64 A little over ten years ago, Adam Steinman
assembled a not-too-flattering collection of ways authors had
characterized the law of appellate jurisdiction. It had been described as
“‘hopelessly complicated,’ ‘legal gymnastics,’ ‘dazzling in its
complexity,’ ‘unconscionable intricacy’ with ‘overlapping exceptions,
each less lucid than the next,’ ‘an unacceptable morass,’ ‘dizzying,’
‘tortured,’ ‘a jurisprudence of unbelievable impenetrability,’ ‘helterskelter,’ ‘a crazy quilt,’ ‘a near-chaotic state of affairs,’ a ‘Serbonian Bog,’
and ‘sorely in need of limiting principles.’”65 Subsequent years have not
been any kinder.66 Indeed, in one recent decision out of the Sixth Circuit,
the court candidly acknowledged that it couldn’t figure out whether it had
62. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 729 (1993) (“[T]he unanimous view of commentators is
that the rule has either too many or too few exceptions, but in any event requires revision.”). Some
suggest that the system is functioning relatively well. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and
Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 179 (2001)
(“[T]he current regime is in far better shape than commonly appreciated.”); Steinman, supra note 1,
at 1272 (“The federal courts . . . have worked within the cumbersome doctrinal and procedural
framework to implement a system of interlocutory appellate review that, in practice, is fairly sensible.
If one looks at the results on the ground—i.e., which interlocutory orders are immediately appealable
and which are not—the jurisdictional landscape is commendable.”). But they, too, note that there is
still room for reform. See Glynn, supra, at 181; Steinman, supra note 1, at 1277.
63. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 1; Steinman, supra note 1.
64. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 13 at 165–66 (noting “the unconscionable intricacy of the
existing law, depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next”); Cooper,
supra note 13, at 157 (“The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a list of
elaborations, expansions, evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity.”);
Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 291 (calling the current system “arcane and confusing”);
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 172 (“The existing federal finality-appealability situation is an
unacceptable morass.”); Waters, supra note 13, at 556 (noting the “dizzying array of statutory and
judicially-created [finality] exceptions”).
65. Steinman, supra note 1, at 1238–39 (citations omitted).
66. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 412 (calling the system “a mess”); Lammon,
Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 1, at 431 (“The broader exceptions are much less
predictable. They are plagued by vague terms and inconsistent treatment in the courts, such that both
litigants and judges spend far too much time trying to determine what can be appealed and when.”);
Petty, supra note 31, at 355 (noting that “[p]redictability has been an elusive goal in the courts’
implementation of the final judgment rule”); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 1, at 1651
(noting the “labyrinthian conglomeration of jurisdictional rules”).
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jurisdiction over the appeal.67 This uncertainty did not affect the ultimate
outcome; the court was either affirming the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity or dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.68 But
it wasn’t sure which.69
The costs of all this confusion can be substantial. Occasionally,
litigants lose their one opportunity to appeal.70 More commonly, judges
and lawyers spend far too much time and effort (and clients’ money)
untying appellate jurisdiction knots.71 It’s not uncommon for litigants in
an appeal to brief both jurisdiction and the merits, only for the court of
appeals to hold that it lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. All that effort
arguing the merits winds up wasted, at least for the time being.
The third problem with treating final judgment as a term of art is that
doing so is unnecessary. Alternatives exist. Much of the appellatejurisdiction literature urges some sort of reform of the current system.
Some authors focus on whether a particular type of district court order
should be immediately appealable.72 Others address issues presented by

67. Estate of Allen v. City of West Memphis, 509 F. App’x 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177, 190 (2014); Budinich v.
Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988).
71. See Cooper, supra note 13, at 157 (arguing that even “[l]awyers and judges who are experts in
working with the system . . . often encounter elusive uncertainty in seeking clear answers to many
problems”); Munford, supra note 14, at 18 (noting that the appealability regime “provides the kind of
excursions into legal history and abstract analysis that can drive practical litigators crazy”);
Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 172 (“Entirely too much of the appellate courts’ energy is absorbed in
deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and its exceptions to hear cases brought
before them—and in explaining why or why not.”).
72. See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998); Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal:
Parker Immunity and the Collateral Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1
(2015); Pollis, Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 1; Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens on Appeal: The Case for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445 (2012); Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A Suggested Approach
for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733 (2006); Waters, supra note 13; Owen R. Wolfe,
Immediate Appeals: The Circuit Split on the Applicability of the Collateral Order Doctrine to Statutes
of Repose, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2016); Chloe Booth, Comment, Good Things Don’t Come to Those
Forced to Wait: Denial of a Litigant’s Request to Proceed Anonymously Can be Appealed Prior to
Final Judgment in the Wake of Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 205 (2017);
Robyn R. English, Note, Limitations on the U.S. District Courts’ Discretion: Immediate Review of
Post-Aérospatiale Discovery Orders, 44 GEO. J. INT. L. 1455 (2013); Brad D. Feldman, Note, An
Appeal for Immediate Appealability: Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine to Orders Denying
Appointed Counsel in Civil Rights Cases, 99 GEO. L.J. 1717 (2011); Note, Motions for Appointment
of Counsel and the Collateral Order Doctrine, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1547 (1985).
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existing avenues of appeal.73 Still others advocate new trans-substantive
ways to appeal.74 And then there are those that take a more wholesale
approach to appellate jurisdiction, most of which advocate replacing the
current system with one based on categorical rules or appellate court
discretion.75
One common theme in the literature is abandoning reliance on
interpretations of § 1291 and the “final decision” as the foundation of
federal appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all wholesale reform efforts share
one key characteristic: abandoning interpretations of the term final
decision as the basis for most of federal appellate jurisdiction in favor of
a more candid discussion of the issues and interests in this area.76
That’s not to say that any alternative is forthcoming; reform is by no
means certain. But there’s some hope. Congress has given the Supreme
Court power to adopt rules of procedure governing appellate
jurisdiction.77 And the Court has recently endorsed this rulemaking as the
proper means of changing the law of appellate jurisdiction. In Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,78 the Court reiterated its admonition that
73. See Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction
over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365 (2002); James E. Pfander, Collateral
Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 493 (2011); Petty, supra note 31; Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and Ready
for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711 (2013); Solimine, supra note 21; Matthew R. Pikor, Note, The
Collateral Order Doctrine in Disorder: Redefining Finality, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2017);
Matthew O. Wagner, Note, Fixing Perlman: How the Misapplication of a 100-Year-Old Doctrine
Threatens to Undermine Mohawk Industries Inc. v. Carpenter, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1631 (2011).
74. See, e.g., Kilbert, supra note 15 (challenge appeals, inspired by instant replay practices in
professional sports); James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by
Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043 (2011) (appeals by
consent of the parties and the district court); Ankur Shah, Increase Access to the Appellate Courts: A
Critical Look at Modernizing the Final Judgment Rule, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 40 (2014)
(manufactured finality); Joseph Struble, Comment, An Early Roll of the Dice: Appeal under
Conditional Finality in Federal Court, 50 HOU. L. REV. 221 (2012) (manufactured finality).
75. Arguments for discretionary appeals include Cooper, supra note 13, at 163–64; Crick, supra
note 25, at 564; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 293–302; Martineau, supra note 62, at 748–
87; and John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with
Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214–22 (1994). See also Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic
Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 124–27 (1975); Steinman,
supra note 1, at 1278–82. Arguments for categorical rules include Carrington, supra note 13, at 167–
68; Glynn, supra note 62, at 259; Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra note 2, at 21–25; Rosenberg,
supra note 14, at 179. I have suggested a wholesale reform model that combines categorical rules and
a discretionary catch-all. See Lammon, Cumulative Finality, supra note 2; Lammon, Dizzying
Gillespie, supra note 2, at 415–18.
76. See Glynn, supra note 62; Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2; Steinman, supra note 1.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e); id. § 2072(c). See generally Martineau, supra note 62; infra notes 215 and
accompanying text.
78. 558 U.S. 100 (2009).
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Congress has designated rulemaking as the proper avenue for changes to
the rules of appellate timing.79 Congress’s decision, the Court explained,
deserves “the Judiciary’s full respect.”80 The Mohawk Court also noted
that rulemaking “draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and
it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.”81 And the
Court’s recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker stated that changes to
appellate jurisdiction “are to come from rulemaking . . . , not judicial
decisions in individual controversies or inventive litigation ploys.”82 So
rulemaking—“not expansion by court decision”—is now “the preferred
means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be
immediately appealable.”83
The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (the body from which any
new rules of procedure on appellate jurisdiction would originate) has also
shown some interest in reform, though its efforts have so far been false
starts. Shortly after the Supreme Court held in Mohawk that discovery
decisions could not be appealed under the collateral-order doctrine, the
Committee took up the issues of discovery appeals and reform more
generally.84 More recently, the Committee considered codifying the
collateral-order doctrine as part of a more general effort to make federal
litigation more efficient.85 Both of these items, however, were eventually
removed from the Committee’s agenda.86
79. Id. at 113–14.
80. Id. at 114 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995)).
81. Id.
82. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017); see also Hall v. Hall, 584
U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1131 (2018) (repeating this admonition).
83. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 113.
84. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF SPRING 2014 MEETING 15–16
(2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/appellate-minutes-04-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QB7-DW8N]; Catherine T. Struve, Memorandum re: Item Nos. 09-AP-D & 11AP-F (Oct. 20, 2014), in AGENDA BOOK FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 169
(2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/2014-10-Appeals-Agenda-Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EWY-XCHG] (Fall 2014 meeting); Andrea L. Kuperman, Memorandum re:
Immediate Appealability of Prejudgment Orders (Sept. 20, 2013), in AGENDA BOOK FOR THE
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
APPELLATE
RULES
367
(2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/2014-04-Appeals-Agenda-Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QH9U-UBVX] (Spring 2014 meeting).
85. See Gregory E. Maggs, Memorandum re: Further Discussion of Ideas for Making Federal
Appellate Litigation More Efficient (May 2, 2017), in AGENDA BOOK FOR THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 432–35 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/201705-appellate-agenda-book_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z99X-J2S4] (Spring 2017 meeting); Stephen E.
Sachs, Memorandum re: Collateral Order Doctrine, in AGENDA BOOK FOR THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES, supra, at 436–44.
86. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF SPRING 2017 MEETING 10 (2017),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ap05-2017-min_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EAF-HRY6]
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But whatever the likelihood of reform, the fact remains that the system
of federal appellate jurisdiction does not need to be built atop § 1291 and
its use of the term “final decisions.” And if wholesale reform occurs, it
will almost certainly abandon that approach to crafting the rules of federal
appellate jurisdiction.
II.

THE THREE CONTEXTS IN WHICH COURTS HAVE
INTERPRETED FINAL DECISIONS

Before abandoning the term “final decision,” however, there’s
something to be learned from it. Previous calls to reject the term (some of
my own included) have focused on one way in which the courts use it: to
craft rules about when litigants can appeal before the end of district court
proceedings.87 This is a key role that interpretations of § 1291 have
played. But it’s not the only one. Courts have also interpreted § 1291’s
use of the term “final decisions” to create two other kinds of jurisdictional
rules. First, courts have given the term a variety of meanings to craft rules
about when litigants can take their traditional, end-of-proceedings appeal
on the merits. Second, courts have used the term “final decision” to limit
or expand the issues that a court can address in an appeal before the end
of district court proceedings.
These other two uses of the term “final decisions” have been
overlooked in the literature. But they have produced rules that are
essential to a well-functioning system of appeals. Reform efforts that
abandon case-by-case interpretations of § 1291 and the term “final
decision” must therefore adopt rules that fill all of the roles that the term
has played. Otherwise, reform will leave gaps in the law and unaddressed
issues.
A.

True Finality

The first context in which courts have interpreted § 1291 involves rules
on what I call “true finality.” These rules involve what might be called the
traditional “end-of-proceedings” appeal as of right. (The scare quotes
(declining to add a project that would codify the collateral-order doctrine to the Advisory Committee’s
agenda); ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF FALL 2014 MEETING 9 (2014)
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appellate-minutes-10-2014_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LCU-2UBW] (removing a proposal to craft rules on privilege appeals from the
Advisory Committee’s agenda).
87. See Carrington, supra note 13; Cooper, supra note 13; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1;
Glynn, supra note 62; Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2; Lammon, Perlman Appeals, supra
note 2; Martineau, supra note 62; Nagel, supra note 75; Petty, supra note 31; Redish, supra note 75;
Steinman, supra note 1; Lawyers Conference Comm. on Fed. Courts & the Judiciary, The Finality
Rule: A Proposal for Change, 19 JUDGES J. 33 (1980).
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around “end-of-proceedings” are required since, as we’ll soon see, these
appeals don’t always come at the actual end of district court proceedings.)
And these rules interpret the term “final decision” to identify the point at
which litigants can take this traditional appeal.
The point at which litigants can take this traditional appeal is a key
point in federal litigation for two reasons. First, aggrieved litigants have a
near-absolute right to appeal at this point. Regardless of any uncertainty
about when litigants can appeal before this point, the traditional appeal is
a certain and reliable opportunity that exists in nearly every case. Lawyers
unfamiliar with all the rules allowing appeals before a final judgment
likely know that they can appeal at this point. And all decisions up to this
point merge into the final disposition of the action.88 In this appeal,
aggrieved litigants can thus appeal any issue that the district court decided
so long as subsequent events have not rendered that decision moot.
Second, litigants have a brief window of time in which to begin this
traditional appeal. These appeals normally begin with the filing of a notice
of appeal.89 Litigants have a limited time to file that notice. In most civil
cases, for example, they have thirty days after entry of the judgment.90
When the government is a party to a civil case, the time extends to sixty
days.91 In criminal cases, defendants generally must file their notice
within fourteen days of the judgment or order being appealed.92
Compliance with these time limits is critical. In Bowles v. Russell,93 the
Supreme Court held that a late filed notice in a civil case is ineffective.94
The time limits for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case come from a
statute—28 U.S.C. § 2107. The Bowles Court reasoned that this statutory
period is “jurisdictional”—that is, it limits the courts of appeals’
jurisdiction.95 So a late-filed notice has fatal consequences for litigants: it
88. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3905.1.
89. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1). When the court of appeals has discretionary jurisdiction over an
interlocutory appeal, the appeal begins with the filing of a petition to appeal under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5(a)(1). An appeal in post-conviction proceedings can begin with the filing of a
request for a certificate of appealability. See id. R. 22(b)(2).
90. Id. R. 4(a)(1)(A).
91. Id. R. 4(a)(1)(B).
92. Id. R. 4(b)(1)(A).
93. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
94. Id. at 214. For an in-depth discussion of appellate jurisdiction and late-filed notices of appeal,
see 16A WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 19, at §§ 3950.1, 3950.5.
95. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213; see also Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. __,
138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (“If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from
one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional; otherwise, the time
specification fits within the claim-processing category.” (citation omitted)). Bowles was part of a
larger Supreme Court effort to clarify which rules are jurisdictional (and thus not open to judge-made
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deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction and requires dismissing the
appeal; the parties cannot waive the matter; the court must raise the issue
on its own initiative; and no equitable exceptions are allowed.96 Although
the courts have not yet definitively determined the jurisdictional nature of
every one of Rule 4’s notice-of-appeal deadlines, “the prudent appellant
will act as though all the . . . time limits are jurisdictional.”97 Litigants
accordingly must be able to determine when district court proceedings
have ended. Failure to do so risks losing their right to appeal.
The point at which litigants can take their traditional, “end-ofproceedings” appeal as of right is thus an important one. And ideally
litigants would be able to easily and readily identify that point. But,
perhaps surprisingly, identifying that point is not always simple. Often the
right to take a traditional, “end-of-proceedings” appeal arises at the actual
end of district court proceedings—the “final decision” for purposes of
§ 1291 comes when the district court proceedings are over. But not
always.
This section provides five examples of this phenomenon. In three—
attorneys’ fees decisions, the technical/ministerial rule, and consolidated
proceedings—courts have held that a decision near the end of district
court proceedings is final even though more remains to be done. In another
two—Microsoft Corp. v. Baker and administrative remands—courts have
held that there is no final decision even though district court proceedings
are over. Some of these rules make some practical sense or produce
pragmatically sound outcomes. But importantly, they all stem from
interpretations of the term “final decision.”
Note, each of these situations deals with district court decisions that
come near or at the actual end of district court proceedings. I discuss in
the next section decisions deemed final even though they came well
before the end of those proceedings.
1.

Attorneys’ Fees Decisions

The first example of a true finality rule governs district court decisions
that resolve the merits of a dispute but leave open an issue of attorneys’
fees, such as the entitlement to them or their amount. In Budinich v.

exceptions) and which are claims-processing rules (and thus open to waiver and judge-made
exceptions). See generally Wasserman, supra note 12.
96. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214.
97. 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3950.1. But see Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 22 (holding that
Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s limit on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal was not jurisdictional).
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Becton Dickinson & Co.,98 the Supreme Court held that a decision on the
merits was final even though an outstanding issue of attorneys’ fees
remained.99 The district court first entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the merits and then, several months later, granted the
plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees.100 The plaintiff (seeking a larger
damages award) filed his only notice of appeal after the decision on
fees.101 When it came to appealing the merits, the Court concluded that
this notice was late—the district court’s merits decision was final once
judgment was entered on the merits, and the plaintiff had thirty days after
that to file a notice of appeal.102 The Court reasoned that a final decision
is one that resolves the merits of a case, and an issue that will not affect
the decision on the merits (such as a request for attorneys’ fees) does not
affect the finality of that decision.103 The Court recently reiterated this
holding in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund,104 which held
that the same rule applies even if the entitlement to attorneys’ fees is a
contractual (rather than statutory) matter.105
In both Budinich and Ray Haluch, district court proceedings were not
over once the merits were decided. More remained to be done—determine
the entitlement to, and possibly the amount of, attorneys’ fees. Those
proceedings would end only after a decision on the attorneys’ fees issues.
The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the merits decision was the
final one. At that point, the aggrieved parties had a right to appeal. The
time for filing the notice of appeal also had begun running. The case was
“over” for the purpose of the right to appeal the merits, even though
district court proceedings were only close to being over. Indeed, if a final
decision is one that ends district court proceedings, proceedings end twice
in these cases—once when the district court decides the merits and again
when the district court resolves the attorneys’ fees issue. Both produce a
final decision from which a party has a right to appeal. And so both, oddly
enough, would mark the end of district court proceedings.
The wisdom of this rule is questionable. Why not delay the appeal until
after the attorneys’ fees issue has been resolved? That way, both the merits
and any subsequent dispute over fees could be resolved in a single appeal.
98. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
99. Id. at 203.
100. Id. at 197–98.
101. Id. at 198.
102. Id. at 200; see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
103. Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199–200.
104. 571 U.S. 177 (2014).
105. Id. at 179.
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As things stand, the attorneys’ fees rule can require two different
appeals—one of the merits and another on fees.
But for present purposes, it’s enough to note that besides illustrating
the use of § 1291 to create a rule governing true finality, the rule from the
attorneys’ fees cases illustrates one approach to interpreting the term
“final decision.” Budinich involved a highly formalistic interpretation of
that term. The Court said that a final decision is one that resolves the
merits of a dispute.106 Attorneys’ fees have not historically been
considered part of a dispute’s merits.107 So, according to the Court,
unresolved attorneys’ fees issues do not affect the finality of a decision on
the merits.108 Hence, the rule for outstanding issues of attorneys’ fees.
2.

The Ministerial/Technical Rule

A much less formalistic interpretation of the term “final decisions” can
be seen in the ministerial/technical rule, which sometimes deems a
decision on liability final even though the amount of damages has not yet
been decided.109 Generally speaking, a decision on liability that leaves
open the amount of damages is not final or appealable.110 And rightfully
so; a decision on only liability does not end district court proceedings.
But courts have occasionally allowed appeals from these
determinations of liability under the ministerial/technical rule.111 Under
that rule, so long as the determination of damages would be a ministerial
or technical matter—that is, the parties don’t really dispute the amount of
damages and the district court could calculate it simply—courts have
called the liability decision a final one and allowed the appeal.

106. Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199–200.
107. See id.
108. Id. The Court also noted the importance of a bright-line, uniform rule in this context. See id.
at 202. But it seems to have used a formalistic definition of the merits to pick its bright line.
109. For a more in-depth discussion of the ministerial/technical rule, see Lammon, Dizzying
Gillespie, supra note 2, at 400–02.
110. See Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.
Townsend, 793 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Damages are part of the judgment and essential to
finality; lack of quantified damages prevents an appeal.”).
111. See Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding in a tax-refund suit
that a district court order granting a refund but not calculating the amount was appealable, as “the
calculation of this refund [was] merely a ministerial task”); Prod. & Maint. Emps. Local 504 v.
Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1401–02 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court order
concluding that an employer had wrongfully amended a retirement plan was appealable even though
the court had not calculated the proper amount of accrued benefits because “[d]etermining that amount
[was] just a matter of plugging information into the formula”); Woosley v. Avco Corp., 944 F.2d 313,
317 (6th Cir. 1991).

10 - Lammon (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

1830

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/6/2019 12:35 PM

[Vol. 93:1809

There’s some pragmatic force to the technical/ministerial rule. Courts
in these cases often see few costs in allowing the appeal; all issues the
parties might dispute have been decided, so there is little or no risk of an
additional appeal.112 And a lot of time and effort would be wasted were
the appeal dismissed and subsequently refiled after the district court
calculated damages.
But the technical/ministerial rule has costs. For one thing, however
pragmatic the rule might be in a particular case, it creates systemic risks.
Allowing some appeals under the ministerial/technical exception invites
future parties to argue the point, and that effort is wasted when appellate
courts decline to apply the rule.113
And importantly for present purposes, the ministerial/technical rule
requires another definition of what it means for a decision to be final: a
decision on liability is final so long as the calculation of damages would
be a ministerial or technical matter. That definition is inconsistent with
the standard definition of a final judgment, the general rule that a decision
on liability that leaves open the amount of damages is not final, and the
attorneys’ fees cases (damages are part of the merits, so a decision on only
liability is not a decision on the merits). The technical/ministerial rule thus
requires a further elaboration on the meaning of the term “final decision,”
and it adds further uncertainty to identifying when the actual end of
district court proceedings is a final decision.
3.

Consolidated Actions

Another rule on true finality comes from consolidated actions. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows a district court to consolidate actions
that present a common issue of law or fact.114 Actions that present
common questions of fact can also be consolidated under 28 U.S.C.

112. See Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that an outstanding
calculation of expenses was “unlikely to result in a later appeal”); Morgan v. United States, 968 F.2d
200, 204 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The rationale is that when what remains to be done is merely routine, that
routine decision will not spark an appeal; hence permitting the earlier review will not thwart the policy
against piecemeal appeals.”).
113. See Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 190–92 (3d Cir. 2001); Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v.
Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 934–37 (3d Cir. 1994).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). For in-depth studies of consolidation, see generally Joan Steinman, The
Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might
Be Part II: Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42 UCLA L. REV. 967 (1995); Joan Steinman, The Effects of
Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They Might Be Part
1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1995) [hereinafter
Steinman, Part 1].
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§ 1407 for pretrial proceedings as part of multidistrict litigation.115 In
either situation, what were once independent actions proceed jointly for
at least some purposes. But all actions are not necessarily resolved at the
same time. Particularly in multidistrict litigation (MDL), individual
actions might be resolved while others with which they were consolidated
continue. Difficulties have arisen when trying to identify the final decision
in these cases.
In a pair of recent cases, the Supreme Court held that the resolution of
a single action—regardless of consolidation—is a final and thus
appealable decision.
In Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp.,116 the Court held that dismissal
of an action that was consolidated with others in an MDL is a final
decision, regardless of any other ongoing actions in the MDL.117 The
Gelboim Court noted that although cases in an MDL are consolidated for
pretrial purposes, they retain their individual identities.118 Independent
actions are final once all issues in each action have been resolved. So the
resolution of all issues in an individual action is the final decision for that
action, and thus immediately appealable, regardless of what might be
happening in other consolidated actions.119
And in last term’s Hall v. Hall,120 the Court held that dismissal of one
action consolidated with another under Rule 42 was final, regardless of
the status of other actions with which it was consolidated.121 Like actions
consolidated in an MDL, individual actions consolidated under Rule 42
retain their independent character.122 So, again, resolution of all issues in
a single action is a final decision for that action.123

115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). For in-depth discussions of multidistrict litigation, see generally
Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action Alternative,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (2017); Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing
Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox
Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understanding of
Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017).
116. 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015).
117. Id. at 904.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Court also noted that any other rule would pose practical difficulties; not only would
dismissed plaintiffs need to wait until all other cases are resolved, but they would also face difficulties
figuring out which point marks that resolution. See id. at 905.
120. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1118 (2018).
121. Id. at 1131.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Gelboim and Hall have the merit of being consistent decisions; both
cases define a “final decision” so that resolution of a single action is final
and thus appealable, regardless of the status of any actions with which it
has been consolidated. But they also illustrate the pragmatically unsound
results that can come from interpretations of § 1291.
Gelboim makes sense; forcing the parties in one action in an MDL to
wait for resolution of all other actions would be terribly inconvenient.
MDLs often involve cases with little relation to one another beyond
common questions of fact, and we cannot expect litigants to monitor the
status of all other actions in waiting for their moment to appeal.
Hall, however, makes less sense. Cases consolidated under Rule 42 can
bear a closer relationship to one another than cases consolidated in an
MDL.124 Separate appeals in these actions risk producing multiple,
related, and duplicative appeals.125 Each action in a consolidated action
could be resolved at a different time. If each action is separately
appealable, then consolidated proceedings could produce several appeals.
Those appeals would also likely be related, as consolidated actions
generally involve some overlap in the facts. With separate appeals,
separate appellate panels will have to familiarize themselves with the
same record. And consolidated actions necessarily involve at least one
common question. If each action is separately appealable, those actions
might be presented in multiple appeals.
Avoiding multiple, related, and duplicative appeals is one of the main
reasons for the general final-judgment rule.126 It is often more efficient (at
least from the appellate court’s perspective) to hear all related appeals at
once, requiring only one panel to learn the record, and deciding the
overlapping issues in a single decision. The immediate-appeals rule
therefore conflicts with one of the main interests that underlies the rules
of appellate timing.127

124. Actions consolidated as part of an MDL often come from across the country (hence the
“multidistrict”). Consolidation under Rule 42 involves parties in the same district court, meaning that
the scope of consolidation under Rule 42 is narrower than that of MDL, resulting in a closer
relationship between the consolidated actions.
125. See Lammon, supra note 56, at 1006.
126. See Lammon, Rules, Standards and Experimentation, supra note 1, at 428.
127. This isn’t to say that all appeals should wait until the resolution of all consolidated actions.
There might be times when it makes sense to allow the parties to a resolved action to appeal before
resolution of all consolidated actions, such as when the parties to the resolved action are not involved
in any of the other actions. In arguing for a rule of procedure that would overrule Hall and normally
delay appeals in consolidated actions until the resolution of all actions, I have also argued for a rule
that would allow district courts to certify one action for an immediate appeal. See Lammon, supra
note 56, at 1012–13.
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Consolidated actions thus illustrate not only another way in which the
courts have used § 1291 to craft rules of true finality. They also illustrate
the sometimes practically unsound outcomes that these efforts to keep
those interpretations consistent produce.
4.

Microsoft Corp. v. Baker

The Supreme Court recently crafted a new rule of true finality in
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. The Baker Court held that district court
proceedings were not final when the plaintiffs in a purported class action
had voluntarily dismissed all of their claims with prejudice.128 The
plaintiffs in Baker brought a purported class action on behalf of all owners
of Microsoft’s Xbox 360 gaming console, claiming that a defect in the
console scratched game discs during normal use.129 After the district court
declined to certify the class, the plaintiffs sought permission to appeal that
decision under Rule 23(f).130 When the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the
Rule 23(f) appeal, the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims
with prejudice and then, in an appeal from that dismissal, sought review
of the certification decision.131 The named plaintiffs assumed that reversal
of the certification decision would allow them to reinstate their individual
claims and represent the class.132
The Supreme Court held, however, that the voluntary dismissal was not
a final decision under § 1291.133 The Court saw many problems with the

128. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1707, 1712–13 (2017).
129. Id. at 1710.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1711.
132. This tactic is sometimes called “manufactured finality,” and some courts had allowed it before
Baker. See generally Shah, supra note 74; Struble, supra note 74. Manufactured finality essentially
involves gambling on the chance of reversal, and it arises when plaintiffs suffer an adverse
interlocutory ruling that severely harms, but does not entirely undercut, their case. For example, a
court might rule that a plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages on its claim. The plaintiff hasn’t
lost on the merits at that point, but the compensatory damages alone might not make the case worth
pursuing. The manufactured finality tactic would allow that plaintiff to dismiss the claim not only
with prejudice, but also with the understanding that the plaintiff could appeal the interlocutory
decision on punitive damages. And if the appellate court reverses that decision, the plaintiff could
reinstate the claim. The Rules Committee once considered adopting a manufactured finality rule but
decided against doing so. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF SPRING 2015
MEETING
32–33
(2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-04-appellateminutes_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HDR-CBEH]; CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES OF
APR. 9, 2015 MEETING 21–25 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cv04-2015min_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NQE-EJCC] (voting to do nothing about manufactured finality).
Manufactured finality has an uncertain future after Baker.
133. Baker, 137 S. Ct. at 1707.
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plaintiffs’ attempt at appeal: it increased the risk of multiple, piecemeal
appeals; it undercut Rule 23(f)’s grant of discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in favor of an absolute right to appeal; and it benefitted only
plaintiffs, not defendants.134 For these reasons, the Court held that the
order was not final—and thus not appealable—under § 1291.135
The outcome in Baker was undoubtedly correct—the plaintiffs were
trying to circumvent Rule 23(f) and manufacture the appeal of an order
that they should not have been able to appeal. But the Court’s reasoning
is odd. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence, district court
proceedings in Baker were over.136 The court had entered an order
dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.137 So all issues had
been resolved, and there was nothing left for the district court to do. Under
any straightforward understanding of the term, Baker reached a final
decision. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the majority’s
conclusion that the last order in Baker was not final suggests that there
was never a final decision in the case; district court proceedings in Baker
never ended.
Granted, that’s absurd; of course district court proceedings ended. But
to reach the outcome it did—which, again, was a pragmatically proper
outcome—the Court had to give a new meaning to § 1291: a decision that
marks the end of district court proceedings is final, unless that decision
involves an attempt to circumvent Rule 23(f). The Court thus defined a
“final decision” in a way that prevents parties like the plaintiffs in Baker
from manufacturing an appealable decision.
5.

The Administrative Remand Rule

The administrative remand rule provides another illustration of a true
finality rule.138 This doctrine addresses a problem that sometimes arises
in district court review of administrative agency adjudication. Many
administrative adjudications can be reviewed in federal district courts.139
And it is not uncommon for district courts to remand cases back to the
agency for further proceedings. This can occur, for example, when the

134. Id. at 1713–15.
135. Id. at 1712–13.
136. Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
137. Id.
138. For a more in-depth discussion of the administrative remand rule, see 15A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 19, § 3914.32; Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 386–93.
139. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (providing for judicial review of adverse agency actions).
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district court concludes that the agency applied the wrong legal
standard.140
On the one hand, these remand decisions seem final. District court
proceedings have ended, and all issues before that court have been
resolved. There’s nothing left for the district court to do. The district
court’s decision should therefore be ripe for review. On the other hand,
more remains to be done in the action, albeit not in the district court.
Instead, more remains to be done in the agency. And in many cases,
immediate review of the district court’s remand order could disrupt
administrative proceedings—they might be stayed during the appeal.
Immediate review could also lead to piecemeal review—the court of
appeals might hear a case twice—once after the administrative remand
and again after any further administrative proceedings. Delaying review,
in contrast, would consolidate all issues—issues from both the earlier
agency action and the later agency action—into one appeal.
The general rule in these circumstances is that district court orders
remanding a case to an agency for further proceedings are not final
decisions.141 In Western Energy Alliance v. Salazar,142 for example, the
Tenth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order remanding
a dispute to the U.S. Bureau of Land Management so the Bureau could
take action on the plaintiffs’ lease applications.143 The appeal in Western
Energy Alliance was brought by the lease applicants, not the Bureau.144
And the applicants, if not satisfied with the Bureau’s subsequent actions,
could seek additional review in the district court and, if necessary, on
appeal.145 So the remand in Western Energy Alliance, like most
140. See Davies v. Johanns, 477 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 2007); Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919,
923 (7th Cir. 1993); Perales v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1991); Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427–28 (10th
Cir. 1984).
141. See N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 550 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“It is black letter law
that a district court’s remand order is not normally ‘final’ for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.”); Papotto v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 731 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bhd.
of Maint. Way Emps. v. Consol. R.R., 864 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1988)); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 716 F.3d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2013); W. Energy All. v. Salazar, 709 F.3d 1040, 1048–49
(10th Cir. 2013); Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.2d 1304, 1306 (4th Cir. 1996); Perales, 948 F.2d at 1353;
Crowder v. Sullivan, 897 F.2d 252, 252 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan,
915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990); Mall Prop., Inc. v. Marsh, 841 F.2d 440, 441 (1st Cir. 1988);
Bender, 744 F.2d at 1426–27; 15B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3914.32 (“The general rule is
that a remand [to an administrative agency] is not appealable as a final decision.”).
142. 709 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2013).
143. Id. at 1042, 1051.
144. Id. at 1042. I have adapted the discussions of Western Energy Alliance and Bender (in the next
paragraph) from Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 390–91.
145. W. Energy All., 709 F.3d at 1050–51.
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administrative remands, was not final. Although proceedings in the
district court had ended, there was no final decision.
But sometimes administrative remands are deemed final. Courts have
occasionally held that a particular case requires an exception to this
general rule, primarily when the lack of an immediate appeal from an
administrative remand might leave a party (most commonly the
government) without any chance for appellate review.146 In Bender v.
Clark, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management could immediately appeal a remand that ordered the Bureau
to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine whether
land contained a particular geologic structure.147 The Bureau had rejected
a lease application after the applicant had failed to prove by “clear and
definite” evidence that the land in question did not contain the particular
structure.148 On appeal from the district court’s decision that a different
standard of proof applied, the Tenth Circuit noted that if the applicant
prevailed on remand, the Bureau would have no way to seek review of the
district court’s decision; it could not appeal its own administrative
decisions.149 For there to be any guarantee of appellate review, the Bender
court had to deem the remand decision a final one.
In the administrative remand context, the finality of the district court’s
decision depends on the consequences of the remand—whether the
remand might leave one of the parties without any chance for appellate
review. These decisions make some practical sense. They generally
consolidate all issues in administrative reviews into a single appeal,
thereby avoiding multiple, duplicative appeals. They also ensure that
parties don’t lose their right to have an appellate court review the district
court’s decision. But in all of these decisions, district court proceedings
are over. Litigants often don’t know whether the remand is final until the
court of appeals tells them as much. The administrative remand rule thus
illustrates both another meaning of the term “final decision” and the
confusion that sometimes arises in determining when the end of district
court proceedings is a final decision.
The true finality cases are a distinct context in which courts have used
§ 1291 to craft rules of appellate jurisdiction, specifically rules about
146. See, e.g., In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 751 F.3d 629, 633–
34 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2011);
Davies v. Johanns, 477 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 2007); Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911, 925 (9th
Cir. 2003); Travis v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 1993); Perales, 948 F.2d at 1353;
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Bender, 744 F.2d at
1427–28.
147. Bender, 744 F.2d at 1425–28.
148. Id. at 1425–26.
149. Id. at 1428.
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when litigants have a right—and a limited amount of time—to take their
classic, end-of-proceedings appeal on the merits. As will be seen in
studying the other two ways in which courts have used that term, true
finality rules involve a particular point in litigation and particular
considerations. Rules on true finality govern the traditional, “end-ofproceedings” appeal as of right, which comes at or near the actual end of
district court proceedings. And underlying these rules is a tension between
clarity and flexibility. Because the end of district court proceedings is so
important, courts want to craft clear, predictable, and unchanging rules
defining when that point has arrived.150 The rules on attorneys’ fees and
actions consolidated under Rule 42 illustrate times when this interest has
prevailed. At the same time, courts want some flexibility to reach
pragmatically sound outcomes. Baker and the administrative-remand rule
illustrate times when this interest has won out.
B.

Appealability

The second and probably most common context in which courts
interpret § 1291 involve what I call “appealability.” Appealability rules
address when litigants can appeal before the end of district court
proceedings. Unlike true finality rules, appealability rules involve district
court decisions that come long before the actual end of district court
proceedings. And they address situations in which the normal balancing
of interests that underlies appellate timing has shifted for some reason.
Delaying appeals until the end of district court proceedings has several
efficiency benefits.151 Those proceedings are free from appellate
interruption or interference, allowing the district court to manage the
proceedings.152 Delaying appeals also requires appellate judges to address
a case only once, avoiding multiple piecemeal appeals and requiring
appellate judges to learn a case only once.153 Litigants are saved the cost

150. This is not to say that all jurisdictional rules—or even all rules of appellate jurisdiction—
should be simple and clear. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1 (2011); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387 (2012). But so long as a final decision provides an
opportunity to appeal—what is often the only opportunity to appeal—and a jurisdictional time limit
in which to begin that appeal, making that point as clear and easily identifiable as possible seems
wise.
151. See BAKER, supra note 19, at 35–36; Cooper, supra note 13, at 157–58; Kilbert, supra note
15, at 270–71; Solimine, supra note 21, at 1168–69; Solimine & Hines, supra note 22, at 1547–48.
152. See Solimine, supra note 21, at 1168.
153. See id.
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and potential harassment of multiple appeals.154 And interlocutory appeals
that might eventually become unnecessary—say, because the aggrieved
party ultimately prevails at trial—are avoided.155
But delaying appeals also has costs. Appellate decisions can develop
unclear areas of the law and correct errors. Appellate intervention can
speed along trial court proceedings and cut short what would later turn out
to be unnecessary litigation. And the delay between an erroneous district
court decision and vindication on appeal can cause substantial, sometimes
irreparable, harms.156
Congress has struck this balance in favor of generally delaying appeals
until the end the district court proceedings. But occasionally the balance
of benefits and costs shifts (or is perceived to shift), such that immediate
appeals are warranted in a particular context. The statutes and rules
allowing immediate appeals reflect this shifting balance.
The same goes for the judicial decisions on appealability. In these
cases, the courts address whether a decision is final even though it came
long before the end of district court proceedings. The courts do so by
considering the benefits and costs of allowing an immediate appeal from
a particular decision or a particular kind of decision. Finality, in these
cases, is merely a conclusion—it encompasses all of the considerations
that go into the timing of appeals.
This section discusses two examples of appealability rules—the
collateral-order doctrine and pragmatic appeals. I discuss these examples
only briefly, as courts’ use of § 1291 to allow immediate appeals has been
extensively discussed elsewhere.157
1.

The Collateral-Order Doctrine

The collateral-order doctrine provides the best example of an
appealability rule. That doctrine generally allows immediate appeals of
orders that (1) conclusively decide an issue, (2) resolve an important issue
that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) are
effectively unreviewable in an appeal after a final judgment.158 The
154. Id.; Solimine & Hines, supra note 22, at 1548.
155. E.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in
Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
156. For example, parties who cannot obtain immediate review of an interlocutory district court
order might feel compelled to abandon or settle a case—even if they would have won on appeal—
rather than bear the costs of discovery and trial.
157. See supra notes 1–2, 13–15 & 62 and sources cited therein.
158. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).

10 - Lammon (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/6/2019 12:35 PM

FINALITY

1839

doctrine originated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,159 where
the Supreme Court held that an order refusing to require posting of a
litigation bond was a final decision.160 In Cohen, a state law required a
losing plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs—thereby discouraging
frivolous or baseless suits—and the bond ensured that plaintiffs could do
so before proceeding with their claims.161 A corporate defendant had
asked the district court to require the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative
action to post a bond.162 The district court refused, and the defendant
appealed.163
The Cohen Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over
the bond decision, even though it did not mark the end of district court
proceedings.164 The Court reasoned that § 1291 was meant to bar appeals
from tentative decisions that the district court might reexamine, as well as
decisions that are steps toward—and will eventually merge into—the final
judgment.165 The bond issue in Cohen, according to the Court, was neither
tentative nor part of the final judgment.166 It had been definitively decided,
and it was separate from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.167 And lack of
an immediate appeal would likely result in irreparable harm: the bond
requirement protected the corporation from baseless suits, and a reversal
after the corporation had defended the claim would do nothing to
vindicate that right.168 So if there was to be any appeal of the bond decision
at all, it had to be immediate.
The Cohen Court reached a sensible and practical result. But it did so
only by giving “final” a new meaning. Rather than simply being the end
of district court proceedings, final decisions also included a “small class
[of district court decisions] which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 544–45.
Id.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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adjudicated.”169 The Court added that it had “long given [§ 1291] this
practical rather than a technical construction.”170
The Supreme Court has since elaborated on what it means for a
decision to be final in the collateral-order context, eventually settling on
the three requirements mentioned above. Courts have applied the doctrine
to hold that a wide variety of district court decisions are final and thus
immediately appealable.171 The doctrine allows appeals from orders
denying a criminal defendant’s claim that bail is excessive.172 It allows
appeals from decisions that criminal proceedings would not violate a
defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy.173 It allows appeals
from an order that a pretrial detainee be involuntarily medicated.174 And
it allows appeals from orders denying a variety of defenses, including
those based on absolute executive immunity, state sovereign immunity,
and the speech and debate clause of the constitution.175 All of these
decisions, according to the Supreme Court, are final ones under the
collateral-order doctrine.
Other decisions aren’t. The Court has held, for example, that discovery
orders cannot be immediately appealed under the collateral-order
doctrine.176 Nor can orders regarding the disqualification of counsel or
class certification (although those can be appealed at the court of appeals’
discretion under Rule 23(f)).177 And the denial of other defenses—such as
those based on forum selection clauses, improper venue, a prior
settlement, or vindictive prosecution—cannot be appealed under the

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. For examples of more in-depth discussions of the collateral-order doctrine, see generally
BAKER, supra note 19, at 42–45; Anderson, supra note 72; Lammon, Rules, Standards, and
Experimentation, supra note 1, at 445–59; Petty, supra note 31, at 377–86; Steinman, supra note 1;
Pikor, supra note 73.
172. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 7 (1951).
173. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
174. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003).
175. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (state
sovereign immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982) (absolute immunity); Helstoski
v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (speech or debate clause immunity).
176. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009).
177. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985) (disqualification of counsel);
Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260 (1984) (same); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,
449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981) (same); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465 (1978) (class
action certification).
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collateral-order doctrine.178 These decisions, the Court has held, are not
final and thus not immediately appealable.
All of these examples—those in which the decision was final and those
in which it was not—involved a district court decision that came before
(often long before) the end of district court proceedings and left more
(often much more) to be done in the district court. Some of them were
deemed final. Others were not. But most of the decisions applying the
collateral-order doctrine have little or nothing to do with any intuitive
understanding of what it means for a decision to be final. The doctrine
instead adds a new definition to what it means for a decision to be final:
decisions that meet the three collateral-order requirements are final. And
those requirements reflect some of the general interests that underlie rules
of appellate timing.
For example, the requirement that a decision be conclusively decided
avoids unnecessary appeals. If a district court’s decision is not
conclusive—that is, the district court might reexamine the issue later in
litigation—there is less need for immediate appellate intervention. The
district court might subsequently reexamine the issue and reverse its
position. If it does so, the party that would have appealed the earlier
decision is no longer aggrieved, and an appeal is no longer necessary.
The requirement that a decision be separate from the merits works to
minimize appellate courts’ interference with ongoing district court
proceedings. When litigants appeal an issue that is close to the merits,
district court proceedings might need to be stayed until resolution of the
appeal. This can cause substantial delays, as appeals can take years. By
requiring that an order be separate from the merits to be appealed, district
court proceedings can (at least in theory) continue without much concern
about the appeal.
The requirement that a decision be effectively unreviewable captures
the more fundamental concern that aggrieved litigants be given some
opportunity for appellate review. Some issues become moot by the end of
district court proceedings. Cohen provides one example. Recall that the
purpose of the litigation bond in Cohen was to ensure that a plaintiff could
pay the defense’s expenses if the claim turned out to be meritless; if the
plaintiff can’t post the bond, the plaintiff cannot litigate his claim. An
eventual appellate decision that the plaintiff should have posted a
litigation bond cannot affect the fact that the plaintiff litigated his claim
without doing so. And the protection the bond requirement meant to
178. See, e.g., Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 884 (1994) (prior
settlement); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989) (forum selection clause); Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (forum non conveniens); United States v.
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 264 (1982) (per curiam) (vindictive prosecution).
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provide—protecting against meritless suits—is lost once the litigation
proceeds without the bond. No appellate decision can remedy that.
Finally, the requirement that an order be important reflects the belief
that some issues are simply too important for an appeal to wait; the nature
of a particular decision makes the benefits of an immediate appeal simply
outweigh the costs.
The collateral-order doctrine requirements thus involve a balancing of
the benefits and costs of allowing an immediate appeal for a particular
type of order. Indeed, they’re not even really requirements; courts
occasionally fudge some of them when they think the benefits of an
immediate appeal outweigh the costs.179 So in the context of collateral
orders, the term final decision is used as a conclusion that something is
appealable. Based on its assessment of the benefits and costs of an
immediate appeal, a court concludes that the decision in question should
be appealable. Calling that decision final makes it appealable. So the
decision is deemed final, adding a new wrinkle to the meaning of that
term.
Rarely is the collateral-order doctrine mentioned without
accompanying criticism.180 Most criticisms fall into one of three groups.
First, the doctrine’s requirements obscure the considerations that actually
go into the collateral-order analysis.181 Second, courts’ applications of the
doctrine—especially the Supreme Court’s—have been inconsistent and
often irreconcilable; the three requirements mean different things in
different cases, and the outcomes reached don’t always make sense in
light of previous decisions.182 And third, this opaqueness and
inconsistency has plagued courts and litigators who must deal with the
doctrine’s intricacies.183
What’s important here is that the collateral-order doctrine comes from
interpretations of § 1291 and its grant of jurisdiction over only final
decisions. Collateral orders are final decisions. The doctrine thus requires
further elaborations on the meaning of that term. And it illustrates one

179. See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Qualified Immunity Appeals and the Bivens Question (Sept. 13,
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision that
denials of qualified immunity were immediately appealable collateral orders fudged the requirement
that an order be completely separate from the merits).
180. Indeed, it is probably the most maligned rule of federal appellate jurisdiction. Lammon, Rules,
Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 1, at 431.
181. See Steinman, supra note 1, at 1255.
182. See Anderson, supra note 72, at 540.
183. See Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation, supra note 1, at 431.
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way in which courts have used that term to allow (or disallow) appeals
before the end of district court proceedings.
2.

Pragmatic Appeals

Another group of appealability cases involve the doctrine of pragmatic
appeals. This doctrine goes by several names—pragmatic appeals,
practical finality, the balancing approach—and it involves an explicit
balancing of the costs and benefits of an immediate appeal in a particular
case.184 The doctrine originated in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.,185 in which the Supreme Court held that a decision dismissing a
plaintiff’s state law claims was final, and thus immediately appealable,
even though the plaintiff had other pending claims.186 The Gillespie Court
suggested that finality was to be determined practically, not technically.187
And it essentially engaged in a balancing of the costs and benefits of an
immediate appeal in the context of the case before it.188 On the facts in
Gillespie, the Court concluded that the balance weighed in favor of
allowing the appeal.189 Multiple appeals, the Court thought, were unlikely;
the parties had fully briefed the merits and the question presented was
“fundamental to the further conduct of the case.”190
Nowadays, purely pragmatic appeals are rare. The Supreme Court
questioned Gillespie in a later decision,191 and the courts of appeals are
often reluctant to apply it.192 Despite this general reluctance, litigants still
invoke the doctrine, and courts must spend time addressing (and often
rejecting) their arguments.193 But pragmatic appeals have influenced the
184. Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 377. For examples of more in-depth discussions
of pragmatic appeals, see generally BAKER, supra note 19, at 45–47; 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
19, § 3919; Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2; Redish, supra note 75.
185. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
186. Id. at 154.
187. Id. at 152 (noting that it was “impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases
coming within what might be called the ‘twilight zone’ of finality,” and that the Court had accordingly
“held that the requirement of finality is to be given a ‘practical rather than technical construction’”
(quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))).
188. Id. at 152–53 (noting that “in deciding the question of finality the most important competing
considerations are ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger
of denying justice by delay on the other’” (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338
U.S. 507, 511 (1950))).
189. Id. at 153.
190. Id. at 153–54 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945)).
191. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978).
192. See generally Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 408–09.
193. See generally id. at 405–08.
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resolution of several other issues in federal appellate jurisdiction.194
Pragmatic appeals live on in those decisions.
The important point, however, is that Gillespie’s pragmatic approach
to final decisions provides another definition of what it means to be final.
Unlike the collateral-order doctrine, pragmatic appeals involve case-bycase decision-making. Collateral-order decisions, in contrast, are
supposed to be decided on a categorical basis, holding that a particular
type of order is (or is not) final and appealable.195 So under the pragmatic
approach, a decision is final when the benefits of an immediate appeal in
a particular case outweigh the costs.
Appealability rules illustrate a second context in which the federal
courts use § 1291 to craft rules on appellate jurisdiction, and that context
involves a particular point in litigation and particular interests. Unlike true
finality rules, appealability rules involve district court decisions that come
well before the end of district court proceedings; district court proceedings
are indisputably not over. There is also little pretense that the appeal is the
traditional, end-of-proceedings appeal. It is instead an interlocutory
appeal, after which district court proceedings very well might continue.
And as both the collateral-order doctrine and pragmatic appeals illustrate,
underlying appealability rules is often the balancing of costs and benefits
of an immediate appeal.196 Courts want to avoid multiple, duplicative,
costly, and potentially unnecessary appeals. But they also want to avoid
imposing costs—perhaps irreparable costs—on litigants by forcing them
to wait until the end of district court proceedings.
C.

The Scope of Interlocutory Review

A third group of rules governs the scope of review in an interlocutory
appeal. In any appeal, the court must determine which issues are properly
before it—that is, within its scope of review.197 When an appeal is from a
final judgment, this rarely presents any problems; most every decision that
came before the final judgment merges into that judgment, so every

194. See generally id. at 386–405.
195. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,
315 (1995).
196. To be sure, true finality rules also involve striking a balance between conflicting interests. But
true finality rules and appealability rules involve some different interests, and those that overlap do
not carry the same importance.
197. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3937 (“Once a court of appeals acquires jurisdiction,
it is necessary to determine the extent of its power to act on the case.”).
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district court decision is within the scope of review so long as subsequent
events have not rendered them moot.198
But when dealing with appeals before the end of district court
proceedings, questions sometimes arise as to which issues are within the
appellate court’s jurisdiction. The courts have crafted rules about what can
be appealed in these situations. And, again, they’ve done so under the
rubric of defining a final decision.
This section discusses two examples of rules on the scope of
interlocutory review—qualified immunity appeals and pendent appellate
jurisdiction.
1.

The Assumed Facts in a Qualified Immunity Appeal

The Supreme Court has created some rather intricate rules on the scope
of review in “qualified immunity appeals”—appeals from district court
decisions denying a government defendant’s claim of qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity is a judge-made defense in civil rights actions.199
When plaintiffs allege that government officials violated their
constitutional rights, qualified immunity requires that the constitutional
right at issue be “clearly established.”200 It’s not enough that government
officials violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; the contours of the
violated constitutional rights must have been sufficiently clear at that time
for the government officials to know that their actions violated the law.201
If the right was not sufficiently established, the plaintiffs cannot recover
any damages for the violation. The idea is to ensure that government
officials have notice that their actions violated the constitution and allow
for those officials to make reasonable mistakes.202 This is done in the hope

198. See id. (“If appeal has been taken from a true final judgment that concludes all proceedings in
the trial court, the appeal extends to all orders that have been properly preserved and that have not
been mooted by subsequent events.”).
199. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The qualified immunity literature is vast. For
examples of more in-depth discussions of the defense, see generally William Baude, Is Qualified
Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The
Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 913 (2015); John C. Jeffries,
Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207 (2013); Kit Kinports, The Supreme
Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2016); Joanna C. Schwartz,
How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
200. See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015).
201. See id.
202. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017).
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that government officials can then perform their official duties without
constant concern about the cost and inconvenience of litigation.203
The Supreme Court has held that officials can immediately appeal a
district court decision that denies a claim of qualified immunity.204 This,
according to the Supreme Court, is a final decision under the collateralorder doctrine.205
But not all aspects of that decision are always final. In Johnson v.
Jones,206 the Supreme Court held that the courts of appeals generally have
jurisdiction over only the more purely legal issues in a qualified immunity
appeal.207 Understanding this rule requires understanding the various
issues that can arise in a decision denying qualified immunity. Denying
qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage often involves three
steps: (1) determine the most-plaintiff-favorable version of the facts that
the summary judgment record supports; (2) assuming those facts are true,
determine whether they make out a constitutional violation; and (3) if they
do, determine whether the law was clearly established at the time of the
violation.208
Johnson holds that in a qualified immunity appeal the court has
jurisdiction over only the second and third questions—what the Supreme
Court has characterized as the more purely legal questions.209 The
appellate court generally lacks jurisdiction to review the more fact-based
question of whether the record supports the district court’s assumed
version of the facts.210 It must instead assume the same facts as the district
court and address the other issues.211
This limitation makes some practical sense. Record review can be time
consuming, slowing down the interlocutory appeal and thus further
delaying district court proceedings.212 And appellate courts have no
comparative advantage in determining which facts a summary judgment
203. See id.
204. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
205. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
206. 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
207. Id. at 311–12.
208. See id. at 313; Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007). After determining the factual basis for deciding the issue (step 1), a court has discretion
to address only one of the following steps—whether there was a constitutional violation and whether
that constitutional right was clearly established—if doing so would result in the granting of qualified
immunity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
209. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 319.
212. See id. at 316.
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record supports. The likelihood of a reversal on that issue is low. The need
for immediate appellate review is thus low, too.213 So in qualified
immunity appeals, the appellate courts must not review the district court’s
assumed facts.
That is, unless something in the summary judgment record blatantly
contradicts the assumed version of the facts. The Supreme Court has not
fully articulated this rule. But in two cases—Scott v. Harris214 and
Plumhoff v. Rickard215—the Court rejected the version of facts the district
court had assumed because something in the record blatantly contradicted
that assumption.216 Scott involved an excessive force claim stemming
from a high-speed car chase that ended in an officer ramming a suspect’s
vehicle.217 The district court in Scott denied the officers’ claims of
qualified immunity because, the district court concluded, a jury could
conclude that the officers’ actions were unreasonable.218 But when the
case reached the Supreme Court, that Court rejected the district court’s
version of the facts.219 Without discussing appellate jurisdiction, the Court
concluded that a video of the chase blatantly contradicted the district
court’s assumptions.220 So the Court assumed its own most-plaintifffavorable version of the facts and concluded that the video left no doubt
that the use of force was reasonable.221 The officer was accordingly
entitled to qualified immunity.222 The Supreme Court—again without any
real discussion of appellate jurisdiction—did the same thing a few years
later in Plumhoff v. Rickard.223
These two cases gave short shrift to appellate jurisdiction; Scott didn’t
mention it, and Plumhoff simply said that it was following Scott’s lead.
213. See id.
214. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
215. 572 U.S. 765 (2014).
216. See id. at 2021–22; Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. For in-depth discussions of this development in
qualified immunity appeals, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris and the Future of Summary
Judgment, 15 NEV. L.J. 1351, 1368–76 (2015); Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and Interlocutory
Fact-Finding in the Courts of Appeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1317 (2010); Arielle Herzberg, “The
Right of Trial by Jury Shall be Preserved”: Limiting the Appealability of Summary Judgment Orders
Denying Qualified Immunity, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305 (2015).
217. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 375–76.
218. See id. at 376.
219. See id. at 378.
220. See id. at 378–80.
221. See id. at 381.
222. See id. at 386.
223. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2014) (rejecting the plaintiff’s version of the
facts in a qualified immunity appeal because those facts were blatantly contradicted by a video
recording).
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The Supreme Court has thus not clearly articulated the “blatant
contradiction” exception to the general rule on the scope of a qualified
immunity appeal. But several courts of appeals have done so, interpreting
Scott and Plumhoff to create an exception to Johnson’s normal bar on
reviewing the assumed facts.224
Johnson, Scott, and Plumhoff all necessarily involved an interpretation
of § 1291. That statute provides the jurisdictional basis for qualified
immunity appeals. Any jurisdictional limit on the scope of those appeals
(or exceptions to that limit) must come from that statute. So Johnson,
Scott, and Plumhoff all involve new definitions of what it means for a
decision to be final. And unlike cases on true finality and appealability,
these cases conclude that only parts of a district court’s decision are final.
Johnson provides the general rule that only the more purely legal issues—
whether the constitution was violated and whether that violation was
clearly established—are final. A more fact-based issue of whether the
record supports the assumed facts is not. But under Scott and Plumhoff,
that more fact-based question becomes final if something in the summary
judgment record blatantly contradicts it. In such a case, the court of
appeals has jurisdiction to review that, too.
2.

Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction

The other main way in which courts have used § 1291 to define the
scope of an interlocutory appeal is called pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Pendent appellate jurisdiction allows courts of appeals to review a
decision that would not normally be final or appealable when the court
has jurisdiction over another, related decision.225 The non-appealable
decision piggybacks on the appealable one, giving the court jurisdiction
over issues or parties (or both) that it would not normally have.226 The
Supreme Court has placed tight restrictions on the use of pendent
appellate jurisdiction. In Swint v. Chambers County Commission,227 the
Court suggested that pendent appellate jurisdiction exists when either a
non-appealable issue is inextricably intertwined with an appealable one,

224. See, e.g., Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016); Wallingford v. Olson, 592
F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010); see also George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2013); Romo
v. Largen, 723 F.3d 670, 675 (6th Cir. 2013).
225. See generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3937; Joan Steinman, The Scope of
Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction Before and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J.
1337 (1998).
226. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 3937.
227. 514 U.S. 35 (1995).
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or when review of the non-appealable decisions is necessary to ensure
meaningful review of the appealable one.228
Application in the courts of appeals, however, has not been as strict.
Qualified immunity appeals again provide an example. Civil rights actions
can involve claims against both individual government officials and the
municipality that employed the officials.229 Municipal defendants do not
get qualified immunity.230 They are also not liable through normal theories
of respondeat superior. They are instead liable for their employees’
actions only if those actions were the result of the municipality’s policy
or custom.231 If the district court denies a municipality’s motion to dismiss
a civil rights action due to the absence of a practice or policy, that decision
is not final or appealable.232
The courts of appeals have nevertheless occasionally reviewed issues
of municipal liability in a qualified immunity appeal by the individual
officers.233 In these cases, the appellate courts conclude that the qualified
immunity and municipal liability questions are intertwined, as the
municipality is liable only if the government officials violated the
constitution.234 So while denials of the municipality’s defense are not
normally final, they can be.
These decisions are difficult to reconcile with Swint, which involved a
municipality attempting to piggyback on a qualified immunity appeal. It’s
also difficult to see how municipal liability is inextricably intertwined
with qualified immunity. Determining whether an officer is entitled to
qualified immunity requires addressing only whether the official violated
a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established. There
is no need to address whether a municipality has an unconstitutional
policy or custom to decide whether one of that municipality’s officials is
entitled to qualified immunity. An official’s entitlement to qualified
immunity has nothing to do with the municipality’s liability; there’s no
intertwinement. And an individual’s entitlement to qualified immunity
228. See id. at 50–51.
229. See, e.g., Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2017) (addressing excessive-force claims
against individual police officers and the city that employed them).
230. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
231. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
232. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 41–43.
233. See, e.g., Novoselsky v. Brown, 822 F.3d 342, 357 (7th Cir. 2016); Pollard v. City of
Columbus, 780 F.3d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 2015); Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, 734 F.3d
519, 524 (6th Cir. 2013); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 n.11 (4th Cir. 2012); Cooper v.
Martin, 634 F.3d 477, 481–82 (8th Cir. 2011).
234. See, e.g., Novoselsky, 822 F.3d at 357; Pollard, 780 F.3d at 401; Altman v. City of High Point,
330 F.3d 194, 207 n.10 (4th Cir. 2003); Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 904–05 (9th Cir.
2000).
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can be meaningfully reviewed without addressing the municipality’s
liability.
Decisions on the scope of an interlocutory review are thus the third
context in which the courts have interpreted § 1291 to craft rules of
appellate jurisdiction. Unlike rules of true finality or appealability, rules
on the scope of interlocutory review address issues that arise when a case
is already in the court of appeals—there is no concern about whether a
litigant can appeal at all. The concern is instead with what issues the
litigant can appeal. And as the special rules for qualified immunity appeals
and the rules on pendent appellate jurisdiction illustrate, the
considerations that underlie these rules are different than those of true
finality and appealability. The concerns are largely those of efficiency and
necessity. Johnson’s general limitations on the scope of qualified
immunity appeals makes those appeals more efficient. As the Supreme
Court saw it, the legal issues were the more important ones in that context.
The Johnson rule let the appellate court get straight to those issues without
getting bogged down in possibly cumbersome record review. Pendent
appellate jurisdiction, in contrast, can be explained by necessity: if the
appellate court is to decide the issue over which it has jurisdiction, it must
be able to address a related issue. Otherwise, the appeal would be
ineffective.
III. FINAL DECISIONS AND REFORM
Courts have thus interpreted § 1291’s grant of jurisdiction over final
decisions in three different contexts to create three different kinds of
appellate jurisdiction rules. Recognizing these three kinds of rules is
important for two reasons.
First, acknowledging these distinct ways in which courts have used
§ 1291 could bring some clarity to the law in this area. For now, the task
of crafting the rules of appellate jurisdiction will remain with the courts.
When confronting issues of appellate jurisdiction, it might benefit the
courts to more candidly distinguish the different contexts in which they
interpret § 1291. Doing so would bring some clarity and precision to these
decisions. Courts could recognize the distinct issues that a particular issue
raises and directly address them. This would not only avoid confusing the
issues, but it would also inject some much-needed transparency into the
decisions.
Granted, asking courts to candidly discuss these issues might be a lost
cause. Courts have purported to interpret the term final decision for
decades and are deeply enmeshed in that practice. Courts also might be
wary to so candidly acknowledge their law-making role when it comes to
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appellate jurisdiction. Still, a little more candor in this context might go a
long way to resolving some of the confusion in this area of the law.
The second and more important reason for recognizing the three kinds
of rules concerns rulemaking. Rulemakers are a much better target
audience because recognizing these distinctions is crucial to reform. As
discussed in Part II, most reform efforts have focused only on issues of
appealability.235 But as this article shows, that’s not the only role that
interpretations of the term final decision have played. Reform focused on
only appealability will not address all of the issues that plague the current
system. More importantly, if interpretations of the term final decision no
longer form the basis for most of appellate jurisdiction, new rules will
have to fill all three roles that that the term final decision has played.
Fortunately, every task to which the term final decision has been put
can be addressed through rulemaking. An amendment to the Rules
Enabling Act in the early 1990s—found at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)—
empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules on when a district court
decision is final for purposes of § 1291.236 This power is perfectly suited
to address issues of true finality. And in using it, the Court could establish
a new baseline for a final decision that is clear, easily identifiable, and
unchanging. That point might be one that already occurs in the course of
federal district court proceedings, such as entry of the judgment under
Rule 58.237 Or the Court could create a new point in litigation at which the
district court expressly declares that it is done with the case.238 Such a rule
might obviate some of the difficulties litigants have identifying the end of
district court proceedings and minimize the occasions when litigants lose
their right to appeal due to a late-filed notice.
This is not to say that appeals would be allowed only at the actual end
of district court proceedings. There must be other, earlier opportunities for
review in certain circumstances. But those opportunities can still be
created without resorting to interpreting the term final decision. Another
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), allows the Supreme Court to adopt rules
235. See supra note 76 and sources cited therein.
236. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2012). Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court “may define when a
ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.” Id.
237. This is somewhat similar to the old Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, which required entry
of a written judgment before the time for filing a notice of appeal began to run.
238. Arizona has something like this in Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which provides that
“[a] judgment as to all claims and parties is not final unless the judgment recites that no further matters
remain pending and that the judgment is entered under Rule 54(c).” ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 54(C). The federal
rules could adopt a similar provision whereby a district court must expressly state that it has disposed
of all issues and is done with the case; only at that point do litigants have a right (and a specific amount
of time) in which to begin their appeal.
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allowing the immediate appeal of district court orders.239 Rules
promulgated under this statute could address issues of appealability and
the scope of interlocutory review. As to appealability, rules-based reform
could candidly address whether to allow appeals from particular district
court decisions, either through categorical rules or a general grant of
discretion. In crafting these rules, rulemakers could directly address the
efficiency, error-correction, and law-development interests that underlie
the timing of appeals. As to the scope of interlocutory review, rules could
similarly provide for any limits or expansions on that scope. And those
rules can be candidly based on notions of efficiency and fairness that
underlie the current doctrines. In both cases, rulemakers could address
these matters without the baggage of interpreting what it means for a
decision to be final.
The point for now, however, is to simply recognize that the federal
courts have interpreted the term final decision in three contexts to create
three kinds of appellate jurisdiction rules. This insight is crucial to both
the understanding of our current system and any attempts to change it.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction over nearly all federal appeals comes from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291’s grant of jurisdiction over only “final decisions” of the district
courts. But that term—final decisions—has many meanings. An immense
body of law has been built atop it through judicial interpretations. The
effort to build a body of law with these interpretations has failed, and a
new foundation for appellate jurisdiction is necessary.
Before abandoning the term, however, it is important to recognize the
work it has done. The federal courts have interpreted the term final
decision in three contexts to create three kinds of rules: (1) rules about
when district court proceedings have ended and parties can take the
traditional, end-of-proceedings appeal on the merits; (2) rules about when
litigants can appeal before the end of those proceedings; and (3) rules
limiting or expanding the scope of review in those appeals. Though
related, these contexts are distinct and involve unique issues and interests.
The future of federal appellate jurisdiction—whether it comes from
rulemaking or further judicial decisions—must reckon with these three
distinct kinds of rules and the unique interests that they entail. And
successful reform must fill each of the roles that interpretations of the term
“final decision” have played.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2012) (“The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals
that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).”).

